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CONFLICT AVOIDANCE IN EUROPEAN LAW*
HEm BAIFFOLt
The emergence of techniques for avoiding conflicts between different judicial
systems has special significance in Europe owing to the differentiation among the
laws of various states occasioned and accentuated by the nineteenth-century move-
ment towards codification. Roman law, naturally, was the common basis of those
codifications, but it is well known that it was not their sole source of inspiration.
Customary law (le droit coutun'er), like that which developed in the north of
France, played an important part throughout Europe, even in regions such as the
south of France, where the influence of Roman law has been at its strongest. More-
over, with the growth of industrialization in the nineteenth century, divergencies
among national economic and social structures have increased and have, thus, also
contributed to the development of disparate legal elements. And the fact that the
major codifications were spaced out over more than one century has had its effects
as well. For example, the problems confronting the framers of the Napoleonic
code in 18o4 were not the same as those confronting the framers of the Swiss civil
code in 1907. Finally, the common basis of Roman law no longer applies as such,
in spite of the reality of its partial influence, to English or Scandinavian law; and in
recent times, Soviet law and the laws of various countries in East Europe have been
seen to develop other tendencies based upon an entirely new model. Therefore, a
growing need has long been felt to find a remedy for this dislocation of what has
been called the old European "common law."
The method which has suggested itself naturally is that of treaties of unification,
whether consisting of agreements between two countries, neighbors by tradition as
well as by geography, or of a convention aimed at bringing together the largest
possible number of countries. Alternative methods have been less promising. Thus,
the phenomenon of uniform laws, well known in the United States, does not appear
to have played in Europe more than an indirect role. The existence of foreign
influences has, however, been recognized. For instance, a legislator may take
inspiration from the laws or codes of another country, even transcribing, if necessary,
the exact text of certain provisions. Thus, the Napoleonic code and certain of the
German codes have inspired alike legislators in Europe, South America, and even
the Near and Far East of Asia. Thus, in 1926, Turkey was seen to adopt the Swiss
civil code. But this borrowing has not resulted in any real integration of the laws
concerned, nor has this propagation of similar provisions ever amounted to the
promulgation of uniform laws for the countries involved. In practice, the only way
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in which uniformity of laws has been achieved in Europe has been by means of
treaties.
It must, however, be noted in passing that since the commencement of the
twentieth century, serious efforts have been made to spread the knowledge of foreign
laws. University chairs have been created, institutes have been founded, and reviews
have sprung up for this purpose.' These efforts have paved the way for legislative
consideration of foreign solutions to legal problems, either for the purpose of bene-
fiting from the experience of other countries or for the purpose of endeavoring to
assimilate two different bodies of law. Thus, the most recent of the continental
civil codes, namely the Greek code of 1940, was based on a serious comparative study
of foreign law. In this connection, attention must also be drawn to the valuable
publication of the judicial decisions arising out of the Geneva conventions relating
to negotiable instruments,2 whose object is to help judges, when called upon to
interpret any of the conventions, to conform their decisions with those already given
in foreign countries. The dissemination of comparative information can, thus, exert
a direct and beneficial influence on the judicial elaboration of law. Of course, the
judges in a codification country are bound by the general rules in force in that
country, but for some eighty years past, they have solved problems to which the old
laws, especially in France, gave no answer; and they have solved them with prac-
tically no consideration whatever of foreign law. But there are signs of evolution
in this respect that cannot fail to be stimulated by the dissemination of information
concerning foreign law?
Unification by treaty can be effected in two ways: first, by means of internal law-
e.g., a treaty unifying commercial law in relation to bills of exchange, promissory
notes, and checks; and secondly, by means of rules governing the resolution of con-
flicts of laws. Modern states, whether in Europe or in the United States, have their
own systems of laws, and failing unification of these systems, unification of the rules
applied in resolving conflicts among them is already an appreciable advance. For
the purposes of this article, it will be convenient to examine in succession, first, the
former sort of treaties, then the latter. Thereafter, attention will be turned to a rela-
tively recent conflict-avoidance development (not of a diplomatic nature) that seeks
to avoid the submission of certain contracts to any determined law, the will of the
parties rather being the legal standard, whatever forum may be called upon to
resolve their differences, thus averting the possibility of a conflict of laws.
" It is sufficient to mention here the Zeitschrit fir Ausldndisches Und Internationales Privatrecht,
founded by Rabel in 1927, the journal of the Institute of the same name; the Annuarlo di Diritto
Comparato and the other specialized studies of the Instituto di Studi Legislativi (Galgano); the Inter-
national and Comparative Law Quarterly; and the Revue Internationale de Droit Compar4. These
publications testify to the resurgence of the interest evoked by comparative studies.
2 ERNST VON CAEMM2ERER, INTERNATIONALE RECHTSPRECHUNG zum GENFER EINHEITLICIEN WVECIISEL-
UND SciaECCHi" (954).
a See, e.g., the recent judgment of the Court of Appeal of Paris in Charr v. Hazim Ulusahim, Oct.
21, 1955, relying on its isolated character in comparative law to avoid a solution theretofore admitted
in France.
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The dislocation of the European "common law" by the codification movement
of the nineteenth century has not prevented the conclusion of important treaties
which unify many fields of internal law. These treaties are well known, but they will
be mentioned here briefly, if only to prove that such unification, contrary to the
opinion of many pessimists, is not a mere dream. The ease with which such uni-
fication may be achieved, incidentally, seems largely to depend on the problems
sought to be solved. Thus, the law relating to business affairs has been easier to deal
with than family law, where national or religious traditions and the social structure
play a more important part.
The first fields in which unification was effected were those concerned with in-
dustrial property4 and literary and artistic property.' No doubt, the facility of imi-
tating an invention discovered in one country in another country or of translating
the work of an author of one country in another country rendered international
measures of protection in these areas more urgent. Later, unification was extended
to the fields of international railway transport' and maritime law. The results in
this latter field, in particular, have been especially rewarding. Since the celebrated
rules of the International Law Association of 189o relating to general average, the
use of which, by progressive expansion, has finally resulted in the creation of a real
international common law on the subject, many treaties have been framed under the
aegis of the conference set up at Brussels by the International Maritime Committee.7
Finally, in turn, unification came to the field of aerial navigation s
The League of Nations was also a positive force in this area, having stimulated
the conclusion of conventions on private arbitration in 1923, the execution of arbitral
awards in 1927, interior navigation in i930, and, in particular, negotiable instruments
in i93i, the result of which has been to unify particularly complex laws in a large
number of countries. The negotiators, not having achieved complete unification,
were, nevertheless, wise enough to maintain their agreement upon the points settled
and to conclude another convention unifying the rules applied in resolving conflicts
of law in those matters where differences still existed in the application of internal
law. This exemplifies the duality of means in which unification can be secured.
The study of future possible unifications of internal law by treaty is under con-
sideration at Rome by the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law,
whose important work on the contract of sale is well known, and whose year-book
gives details of all the proposals for unification which are under considerationY
The general unification, by means of conventions, of the rules for the resolution of
conflicts of law was a preoccupation of Mancini immediately after the Italian codifica-
'Union of Paris, 1883, revised in London in 1934.
'Union of Berne, 1886, revised in Brussels in 1948.
' The Berne Convention of i89o.
'E.g., conventions on collisions and aid to vessels in distress, i9io; the responsibilities of shipowners
and bills of lading, 1924; and rights against and hypothecation of ships, 1926.
' Union of Warsaw, 1926, revised in Rome in 1933.
03 L'UNIFICArION Du DROIT; APERCU kNiRA.L DEs TRAVAUX POUR L'UNIFICATION DO DROIT PRsvi
(PojrTs ETr CONVEDrMoNs) 1947-1952 (1954).
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don of 1865. His views on the dislocation of European "common law" stemmed
from a contemplation of the dislocation of the different systems of conflict of laws.
His proposal, made as early as 1867, for an international conference, postponed by
reason of the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, spurred the unsuccessful attempts of the
Italian government (i874-1881) in this regard. His goal was realized, however,
owing to the initiative of the Dutch Government, in 1893, and the spacing out of the
above dates demonstrates the continuity of his ideas. Everyone is familiar with the
astonishing success and subsequent disappointment of the Hague conventions. They
had been successful in unifying the conflict rules over a wide range of subjects, such
as marriage, guardianship, and succession, in a large number of countries; but this
success is now seen to have been more apparent than real. The signatory countries
were exclusively those that already had admitted the test of national law and had
accepted the general extension of that test; divergencies of interpretation were fol-
lowed by denunciation; and the first world war finally put an end to the application
of the conventions between many countries which had become enemies.10 Never-
theless, it would be presumptuous to regard the Hague conventions as obsolete, as
they still bind a considerable number of countries." Further, the spirit animating
the seventh session, held in i95i, seems to augur well for the future. The proposals
are less ambitious, and they concentrate on more precise subjects that are particularly
useful in the business world, such as the law relating to the sale of movables and
the recognition of the personality of foreign corporations. 2
The relative obsolescence of the earlier Hague conventions had aroused consider-
able scepticism, especially after the first world war, as to the future fate of treaties
of this nature. Accordingly, it is somewhat remarkable that less reticence appears
to be shown on this subject after the second world war. This difference in outlook
can doubdess be explained by the growing conviction that the way must be opened
towards easier international relations. Other developments in the interim also seem
to reflect this point of view-principally the emergence of regional unifications. The
first to arise was that known as the Nordic Union. Between 1931 and 1934, five con-
ventions were concluded between Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Ice-
land concerning marriage, adoption, guardianship, alimony, judicial competence and
the execution of judgments, bankruptcy, and succession. Unfortunately, informa-
tion is lacking as to the judicial application of these conventions, as it would be in-
teresting to know how far it has been possible to maintain unity of interpretation
in spite of the absence of a supreme common jurisdiction. This lack of judicial de-
cisions, however, is perhaps an indication that these conventions have operated
'10 See ALBERT DE LAPRADELLE AND J. P. NIBOYET, REPERTOIRE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL (1929-31);
PAUL DR LAPRADELLE, CONFERENCE DE DROrr INTERNATIONAL PRIV" DE LA HAYE (No. 162 n.d.).
"See the schedule published in 43 REVUE CRTIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIvi 893 (France
'954).2 On the works of the seventh session, see Morandire, in 41 REVUE CRITIQUE DR DRon" IN-
TERNATION;AL Psuvi 5 (France 1952); and Offerhaus, in 79 JOURNAL DU DRorr INTERNATIONAL 1070
(France 1952). See also Graveson, Hague Conference on Private International Law, 2 INT'L & Coijp,L. Q_ 605 (1953).
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without difficulty. Indeed, the common juridical traditions enjoyed by the signatory
countries would probably go far to explain the harmonious results achieved. Never-
theless, it must be stressed that, while the Atlantic countries (Denmark, Norway,
and Iceland) apply the law of domicile in matters of personal law, the Baltic coun-
tries (Sweden and Finland), being more sensitive to continental influences, apply the
national law in such matters. By means of the conventions, an interesting compro-
mise between the two positions has been evolved.
Attention must also be drawn to the Benelux proposal for conventions unifying
the rules governing conflicts of laws in Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg. 3
This proposal, at present under consideration by the parliaments of the countries con-
cerned, is largely attributable to the learning and efforts of the late and greatly
missed Dutch jurist, Meijers." It must be pointed out that while the conflicts solutions
of Belgium and Luxembourg are frequently the same as those of France, Dutch law,
on the other hand, although based upon a nineteenth-century codification inspired
by the Napoleonic code, has, in many respects, developed its system of the conflict of
laws along lines more closely approaching those of the German solutions. The com-
promise resulting from the Benelux proposal is, thus, of particular interest.
Similarly, efforts are being made at the present time to assimilate French and
German rules governing the conflict of laws. In this connection, a team comprised
of French and German jurists published, in 1954, a volume entitled Private Inter-
national Law in France and Germany Concerning the Family.4 With regard
to each question considered (e.g., marriage conditions, effects of marriage), the
French collaborator has explained the position in French law, the German col-
laborator the position in German law, and a brief comparative evaluation has been
undertaken by one or other of the authors alternatively. That is the necessary
starting point for an assimilation of the rules governing conflicts of law-the foreign
rules must be understood and observed in day-to-day practice. Recently, members
of the French Committee on Private International Law have been invited to a session
of the German council on the same subject, and careful attention will be paid to the
suggestions made at that session in connection with the forthcoming reforms of
German private international law. Such meetings are extremely useful in enabling
neighboring countries to understand each other's law.
Conflict avoidance has recently come to the fore in the fields of the laws of
contract and of companies in connection with an attempt to formulate contracts or
to establish companies that would not be subjected to any particular body of law.
The question has been methodically studied on the initiative of the Council of
Europe, particularly in regard to the creation of European companies that would not
be subject to the law of any definite country. The Council has delegated the study
1* See the text of the proposal- in 40 REVUE CRITIQUE DE DRoIr INTERNATIONAL PRIVI 21O (France
1951).14J. C. B. MoHR AND L. SIREY, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN FRANCE AND GERM. IANY CONCERNING
rilE FAMILY (1954) (the German volume appeared in 1955).
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of the problem to its economic and juridical commissions. The former has ap-
proached the problem with a certain scepticism, posing the question of whether it
is not illusory to imagine that countries would be in favor of establishing companies
whose creative statute could not be tested by any of the respective laws of those
countries. These companies, it is pointed out, would enjoy facilities enabling them
to carry on their activities throughout the whole of Europe and to compete with
companies operating under the legal strictures imposed by countries that had taken
pains to establish and maintain a careful equilibrium between the varying interests of
shareholders, directors, and third parties. Why should special favor be shown to
companies immune from these protective limitations and, at the same time, not sub-
jected to analogous regulations by any other foreign law? The economic com-
mission has, thus, concluded that the establishment of European companies cannot
be contemplated other than in the field of public services, where the problem of
competition does not arise.
The judicial commission has, accordingly, drafted a proposal that permits the
conferment of European status upon private companies that are the holders of a con-
cession in the nature of a public service. Although the concession would depend
on the competence of the country or countries territorially interested, it will, thus,
be possible to confer this status on companies which are comprised, to a large extent,
of citizens or governments of different countries, and whose work will have to be
performed or whose services will have to be rendered in the territory of several coun-
tries--or whose work and services will have to be of interest to countries other than
that in which operation takes place. The status is to be accorded upon the recom-
mendation of the "European Office" by means of a convention concluded between
the countries interested. What is involved, therefore, is the creation of a company
by an act of public international law, which can be anything but frequent; and, in
addition, the act will be limited to companies exploiting a public service.
Article three of the proposal stipulates that the conferment of European status
implies for the company benefiting thereby the acceptance of the competence of the
European Office for all individuals as well as for all governments interested. This
stipulation appears to attribute to that Office a jurisdictional or even a legislative
function, but, unfortunately, there is no further explanation of that function.
The European company is to be governed, in the main, by the rules contained
in the convention providing for its creation and, in a subsidiary way, by the legis-
lation of a named country, specified in the convention. Thence arises, from a jurid-
ical point of view, the main and most interesting difficulty of the proposal. Its
authors hope that the convention creating each of these future companies will be
capable of assigning to the company concerned sufficiently detailed rules of operation
rendering unnecessary any recourse to a particular law. They have, however, per-
ceived the uncertainty of such a method and, as a subsidiary measure, have provided
for reference to a particular named body of law. But in the latter eventuality, the
problem is no longer that of a company which would escape the operation of all
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existing law, even allowing for the fact that the reference to any particular law is
stated to be subsidiary.
Another difficulty foreseen in the proposal is that pointed out by Gianini at the
Lucerne session of the International Law Association in 3952, where an examination
of the problem was on the agenda. The question arises as to whether the countries
that do not sign the convention creating such a company will recognize the com-
pany as having a juridical existence. If the reply to the question is in the negative,
the future companies would be less well treated than existing companies which are
subject to a named body of law, but whose existence is everywhere recognized. That
this difficulty has been perceived is seen in article eight of the proposal, which pro-
vides for the intervention by the European Office in regard to those countries that
are members of the Council of Europe but have not been parties to the convention
creating a particular company. Nothing, however, is said in regard to countries
that are not members of the Council of Europe.
Finally, the proposal indicates the advantages which it would be desirable to
obtain from the interested countries for the benefit of the companies created. In
essence, these are freedom to transfer capital moneys; custom franchises; free entry
of managerial and executive personnel; guarantees against seizure of property (a
difficult matter in any event); power to make contracts including clauses as to
guarantees, rates of exchange, or price; and the immutability of certain clauses de-
spite legislative measures modifying contracts made between a state and individual
citizens (an aim likewise extremely difficult to achieve).
The secretariat of the Council of Europe has received numerous requests for in-
formation on the subject and has, fortunately, prepared a small brochure (which is
not in commercial circulation) containing an interesting account of the work of the
judicial commission and of certain preliminary steps already taken in the direction
contemplated. Two of these ventures are quite instructive. First, there is the Bank
of International Settlement, which, ideally, should not depend on the law of any
one country. Created by an international convention signed at the Hague on Jan-
uary 2o, i93o, it has been described by Mr. Van Zeeland as a really European insti-
tution. The negotiators of this convention, however, did not find it possible to avoid
all reference to an existing body of law, and so, it was provided that juridical per-
sonality should be conferred on the Bank by a resolution of the Federal Swiss Coun-
cil, with a head office at Basle. But the convention added that the creative statute
and any modification thereof should be valid and take effect despite any contradic-
tion with the provisions present or future of Swiss law. The reference to a resolution
of the Federal Swiss Council appeared to establish the Bank as a juridical person
subject to Swiss law. But how could this starting point be reconciled with the power
to adopt the creative statute, even in contradiction with the provisions of Swiss law?
The idea reappears that the Bank ought to be able to exist on the authority of its
own creative statute, the precision of which would serve as a valid legal basis. It
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is not certain that such a hope can be realized, although no difficulty seems to have
arisen as yet.
The same difficulty arises in another most curious and typical case, namely,
that of the Scandinavian Airlines System. Again, it is the Scandinavian countries
that afford an example of the need for special relations between countries organized
so as to avoid, to as great an extent possible, the conflict of laws. The three com-
panies which constitute the System understandably wished that the new organism
should be neither Danish, Norwegian, nor Swedish, and so, its English title is not
a mere commercial invention, but rather gives effect to the underlying reason for its
formation. It is not simply a question of a contract between companies preserving
their respective independence, in as much as the creative statute of the System pro-
vides that the consortium is to act as an autonomous moral person. (Article fifteen.)
The statute specifies at the end of its provisions that "the present agreement has
been made in three original copies in the English language"; that each party is to
have the text translated in its own national language; that the translations are to
be exchanged among the parties; and that in case of any difference among the
texts translated into any national language, the English text is to prevail. It was also
desired that the head office of the System should not indicate attachment to any one
of the countries concerned. Thus, article nine provides that the Council of Admin-
istration is to choose the place for the head office as well as for any other offices,
and the Council is, under article eight, to meet in each of the three countries alter-
natively.
The founders of the System have thought of eventual difficulties. Under article
seventeen, differences between the associated companies are to be submitted to an
arbitral tribunal composed of three members, nominated respectively by a Danish,
Norwegian, and Swedish judge. The statute goes on to provide that the tribunal
is to elect its own president, adopt its own rules of procedure, and determine its
own place of meeting and the "national jurisdiction" which is to be applied. By
"national jurisdiction, .... national law" is doubtless intended to be understood.
The totality of these provisions shows the founders of the System persevering
in their wish to remove therefrom anything in the nature of a national character.
They have, however, understood that such an objective could only be attained by
depriving the judges of the particular countries concerned of any jurisdiction what-
ever in the resolution of difference arising from the application of the creative
statute. Nevertheless, they have not thought it possible to affirm that the arbitral
tribunal should be able to exclude any possible reference to any body of law what-
ever. Not having ventured to choose such a body of law themselves, they have left
that duty to the arbitrators, for whom, however, the task is not any the easier. As
a matter of fact, however, it may well be that difficulties will be rare and that
these will perhaps be matters of fact rather than of law. Further, if they are legal,
the similarity of the three bodies of law when compared will probably often allow of
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a solution which will not depend expressly on one such body of law rather than
any other.
These experiments give rise to the thought that the creation of companies whose
creative statutes are, at the same time, their sole basic law will scarcely be able to
avoid the simultaneous creation of jurisdictions specially entitled to interpret those
statutes. This point, indeed, was raised at the Lucerne session of the International
Law Association in 1952. A rather powerful movement has arisen in favor of what
are called "chartered companies"--that is to say, companies whose creation, decided
in agreement with the governments concerned, would be governed by statutes so
detailed that recourse to any body of law whatever would be unnecessary. That
movement contemplates powerful companies pursuing their activities in several
countries without having a principal establishment in any of them-as is often the
case with holding companies. Why should it not then be recognized that these
companies may exist in conformity with their creative statutes instead of exacting
their submission to the law of a country with which they have no more substantial
connection than with another country? The artificial character of this latter course
becomes quite apparent when companies of this sort subject themselves, as they
often do, to the laws, more liberal in effect, of small countries with which they have
no significant bond. It would surely be better to recognize the reality of the situation,
namely, that what is in question is a form of international companies which, in all
seriousness, cannot be subject to any determined body of law.
In contrast to the movement favorable to chartered companies, another current
of ideas sets up the impossibility of all-inclusive creative statutes, however well they
may be framed. To say that the creative statute of a company shall be its legal basis
is to contend that such a statute will comprehend an experience as extensive as a
complete juridical system, and such a contention can hardly be upheld. A belief
much in vogue with men of business is that the general conditions of a contract,
provided that they are sufficiently detailed and precise, are sufficient to avoid all
litigation, and, in any case, all recourse to a body of law. That may be true in a
considerable proportion of cases, but jurists know that problems will always arise
for which no solution can be found either in the creative statute of the company
or in the general conditions of the contract. The judges, therefore, or the arbitrators
confronted with the problem will have to interpret and complete the relative creative
statute or contract, and inevitably they will be led to rely on a general system-that
is to say, on some existing body of law. It can hardly be expected that a judge or an
arbitrator will create sui generis a method of interpretation and general rules for
the particular case submitted to him. The recent experiments, such as that of the
Scandinavian Airlines System, show that the refusal to subject the contract or creative
statute of a company to a particular body of law raises the necessity of providing for
an arbitral jurisdiction that will create the rules necessary for the fulfillment of the
contract or statute. In so far as the bodies of law affected are relatively similar,
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the task will be easy of realization. If it is a question of more divergent bodies of
law, some work of synchronization will doubtless be required. It will, above all, be
necessary to avoid a position in which each judge would interpret the conventions
of the parties according to his own system.
It is difficult for the writer to visualize a contract establishing obligations on its
own without being set within the framework of a judicial system which determines
in what conditions the judges may enforce the contract. But this problem is outside
the scope of the present article.
